Erik: Renan, thank you for joining us on the podcast today.
Renan: Thank you for having me.
Erik: Yeah, I'm looking forward to this one. Normally, we host tech companies. And you're an investor in many tech companies, so we get to have a different perspective on that challenge. But before we get into what you're doing, I'd love to understand how you landed at where you are. I mean, it looks like you started your career more in consulting with McKinsey. You then worked with Richemont as a strategic project manager. Then it looks like you kind of started your first company. Maybe that was the jump off. But what was the path that led you to run OSS ventures?
Renan: Yeah, it's actually a funny one. I was always a nerd. Playing with systems, I disassembled my first computer when I was six. So I've always been a nerd. And so, obviously, I went to math/computer science route in Europe 15 years ago. At the time, there was no tech scene in Europe. I told myself that I had to get a sales job, because playing with computer was not serious. And so I literally put on Google a company that is the best at business in creating CEOs. The number one answer to that was McKinsey & Company. I applied, and they gave me a job. I'm very grateful that they did. Because I didn't know how to read financial statements. I didn't know what the company was, but they trained me a lot.
My second mission was with a manufacturing company. And I fell in love. The fact that you can enter some bizarre big buildings, and they are transforming matter at incredibly high speeds, if you're a nerd and you like systems, that's like the dream. And so I fell in love in manufacturing and operations. I worked a lot in manufacturing and operations. One of my clients said, "Hey, Renan. Come on, and let's stop being consultants. Let's do the real thing." And so I said, yeah, sure. So I went to Richemont. I learned the term. I loved my time here. I saw what it is to be a luxury company at scale. I like to say that in the first manufacturer — because you don't say factory. We say manufacturer. In the first manufacturer that I was in a leadership position, they were producing 200 watches per day. And one watch is like 100 today. So I loved it.
But at heart, I was always a nerd. And so, at some point, the urge to create and to do software was too high. I was a Linux contributor in my free time. So I created a tech company, where I made every single mistake you can make when you make your first company. But at the end, it went well. We went to Brazil because the business model was revolving around personal data. Because of GDPR, the business model was illegal in Europe. So we went to Brazil. We raised funds. I discovered Silicon Valley. That was amazing. I ended up selling the shares in my company to Series B. Nice exit. I was very lucky with that also.
I was sitting at lunch with my wife. I said, you know, we really should try to put some tech in the world of operations. She told me "Yeah, have a go at it." And so that's when I created OSS Ventures. That's kind of how it went. But the funny thing is, I've worked for eight years in manufacturing and operations. Most of them don't understand tech because it's not their work. But I've been working in Silicon Valley for five years. If you ask the average tech group how a manufacturing plant works, you'll get some funny answers. Let's put it like that. So yeah, it's colliding two worlds. It's interesting.
Erik: That's cool. Yeah, it's always funny. When you look at a career in reverse, the logic makes sense. But of course, when you're experiencing it, it's like you're jumping from opportunity to opportunity and then trying to make the best of it. It's great to hear your fascination with manufacturing. Because I think now, to a lot of people, manufacturing is kind of — it's dull. But then when you think about it, well, how does a pencil get made? I mean, could you manufacture a pencil? You couldn't. You could spend 100 years by yourself trying to — you just couldn't figure out how to get the carbon into the wood and even get the wood in the right shape, and all of this. Somehow, we now make Richemont watches 200 a day in these fantastically complex devices. It's just an incredible feat of ingenuity. Now, obviously, digital is taking this to the next level. But digital is also a challenge for manufacturers. Just as you said, there's really a cultural divide. On the one hand, you're used to dealing with atoms and on the other side bits. Trying to kind of get those two cultures together can be quite challenging.
How do you view that in terms of the — where are we now? Obviously, this is a journey that started, I don't know, probably 50 years ago when the first computers started going into factories. So we're not necessarily in step one anymore. But nonetheless, a lot of plants, it still seems like it's really a challenge to wrap the mind around how to adopt digital technologies. Then likewise, a lot of startups have a very high-level sense of what a manufacturer does. But actually, understanding the adoption challenges that that company might have in adopting their technologies is also a mental stretch. Where do you think we are today in terms of the adoption of digital technologies into plants?
Renan: It's actually funny. Because manufacturing like the IBM made a lot of money putting computers in factories when you had no computer at home. So if you were entering a factory, it was the future because there were computers in the factory, and you had no computer at home in the '70s and '80s. But then, for 30 years, it stayed the same regarding computers and personal computers. Also, other verticals such as banking or retail went all out with digitization, while manufacturing was not. There was also another factor that made it so that digital did not penetrate manufacturing that much. It's because manufacturers would make so much money just outsourcing to China or Bangladesh, where cost of labor was so low, that it made absolutely no sense to put a computer. And so that went on until 2000, 2010.
Now the richest man in the world owns two manufacturing companies. Elon Musk owns SpaceX and Tesla. What we think, what I think also, is that Tesla is, to the manufacturing world, what Toyota was to the manufacturing world 30 years ago. 30 years ago, Toyota said, "Okay. Come on losers. I'm going to show you how to run a factory." Then we're having those first seats and those strange rituals of speaking. But they were 20 points better in productivity. And so every manufacturer in 20 years implemented some type of the Toyota way. Today SpaceX and Tesla are showing the way of how it will be.
To put it very simply, software and bits structurally will take between 20% and 30% of the added value, 20% to 30% of the added value in the end product. A car is not a car anymore. The car is software on top of wheels. The second part is 20 points of software in operations, in machines, in process. Let me take an example, Tesla. Today, they are the only car manufacturer in the world that's able to assemble a car in less than 40 minutes of human time. There is one big reason for that, which is the herd. The herd is made by a gigantic hydraulic press. The gigantic hydraulic press, there are a lot of sensors around the herd. The press is done according to AI that is not pressing in the same way for any herd. So every herd is pressed differently. The software says how to press the herd. And so it is made in one pattern only. For every other car manufacturer, it is made in 40 parts and then welded together, which comes with a lot of issues in quality analysis.
The software is taking structurally the large parts of the product added value and of the operation added value. That's where we are going. Those two companies are already doing it. The other companies well in line to go there. For example, Michelin, for example, Sev. For example, BYD in China. Today, it's less than 5% of companies who are already there. The most important challenge to get there is, one, the people in the future. They don't have the right skills. They don't have the right way of managing operations so it's very hard to find the talents. The second part is infrastructure. You have a lot of legacy systems, IT systems that are made 20 years ago to do some job that is not the job that they should do anymore. You have, on top of that, people who are unable to manage the systems.
And so if you look at Toyota and the innovation, it took 20 years. 25% of companies died. 25% of companies were new and rose to the top. 75% of companies went through change at scale, and managed after 5, 10 years to get there into something that is at the same performance level than Toyota. Personally, this is what we see on the shop floor every day. This is what we are through right now. This is the start.
Erik: I want to really dive into this topic of what makes a manufacturer more suitable for digitalization. Then from your perspective as an investor, who do you look at as a viable customer for building a new venture around? But before we dive into that, I think it's important for folks to actually understand how you run your business. Because it's quite a unique business, and it gives some context here.
So you're a venture investor. But you're also, to a large extent, a venture builder and that you're actually identifying ideas and then building ventures around them as opposed to scouting the landscape and making new ventures in existing companies, which is quite unique. Can you just walk us through that processes, and maybe a little bit of the the business logic around why did you choose that model as opposed to a traditional venture capital model?
Renan: Sure. I'll start with why we chose that model. When I came back to Europe, I just wanted to be an investor. I just wanted to invest my money. I didn't want to create a company or manage people. I wanted a simple life. So I interviewed 400 startups in the European and U.S. ecosystem — all specialized in operations. I had three main findings. Main finding number one: operations is 25% of GDP. It's less than 3% of startups. So there is no default. Not enough startups. Finding number two: the average level of the manufacturing founder is very low compared to the FinTech or whatever founder. More often than not, you have people coming from manufacturing trying to create a tech company. But I always tell them the same thing. Would you hire, as a factory head, someone who cannot read a plan? If the answer is no, why would I invest in someone who doesn't know what a tech company is? So that was the second finding. The third finding was speed of companies, speed to prove the product, speed to prove the market was extremely slow — three to four years. Because factories were not opening the door fast enough. It's a very conservative world. And because either the founders came from a manufacturing background and had two clients, or they were from the tech background and they were taking forever to get paid. So I said, okay, if I tried to invest in that ecosystem in the wild, I'm probably going to lose my money.
And so I said, I called a bunch of really, really smart people — my mentors. One of them a U.S. guy from Airbnb, like their first 10 employees. He told me, okay, so you have 25% to the world GDP, and they need software. Yes. They are conservative, but they are able to pay you a lot. Yes. And you have unique insight and you can create a network of factories to create those companies. Yes. He told me, "Okay. So just quit whining and build the thing." And so I started building the thing. The thing is OSS Ventures.
The unique model is that we are in factories all day, an average of two to three factory visits per week with my team. So we build those relationships with factory director, with factory executives. We build those relationships, and we look for pain points. We have, to this day, a little over 1,000 factories that we visited over the last three years. When we see a pain point that is true in more than 40% of factories, and it's a big pain point, they can put massive amounts of money to solve that pain points. The company that is trying to solve the issue and we think is promising. Then we recruit people from the tech world and we say to them, "Okay. We're going to give you half a million dollars. You are going to solve that pain point with those three customers that we already vetted. And we are going to take 25% of equity. You're going to take 75% as founders." And so we recruit people who generally they already created a company and they sold it in the tech world, and they want to solve something in the manufacturing world. They take 75% of equity. We take 25%.
It's been three years and a half. We started 18 companies. We launched 15. Of those 15 companies, 8 were from the series A and were live in a little over 1000 factories all over the world, and growing between 3x and 4x year on year at the portfolio to them. Because the basic thing to solve was penetration of the tech world, the manufacturing world, and speed of execution. And so we had to create the business around those, because investing blindly in companies and hoping for the best is not my kind of strategy. So yeah, that's what we do.
Erik: I love the approach, because it's really driven from a very deep understanding of your customer pains, customer challenges. And so now I can revert to that initial conversation around what the manufacturing landscape looks like. You used as examples a couple of companies — SpaceX and Tesla. Maybe if I think about what type of manufacturing company out there, that's maybe two of the three for me. SpaceX is kind of a machine-builder. It's a very unique machine-builder but it's building very complex, unique assets. Tesla is a discrete manufacturer, very high volume, very sophisticated one. Then I guess the last group would be the process manufacturers, right?
Erik: You could also break that down by different industries that have different characteristics. You could look at SMEs versus multi-factory networks. If you're thinking about who are your target customers, what type of companies do you want to be evaluating and building ventures to support? How do you decide who is a good customer for you?
Renan: It depends on each venture that we build, of course. But let's say that there is an ICP, an ideal customer profile. The ICP is pretty simple. The sweet spot is between 3 and 20 factories. Not gigantic corporations, more like mid-sized. History of wanting to innovate and wanting to scale projects. Usually, it's family-owned. They are open to creating value at a very large scale very fast. Sometimes they're open because they're hungry, and they want to have new businesses. Sometimes they're open because they're dying. They have competition that is making their business very hard. But that drive to succeed and do things at scale is what really launched the collaboration. That's typically for the first two years of reaching the company. You can easily scale 2, 3, 5, 10 million sales with only those kinds of comments. Then you become an established player, and you work with everyone. But it takes time, more time and some processes in place and blah, blah, blah. But for the good market, for the initial launch, we almost exclusively work with those type of companies.
In terms of sectors, consumer goods, electronics, auditing the back, consumer goods and electronics are leading the pack because they are very, very close to the end user. As they are very close to the end user, they need to innovate fast. They have some internal teams. They care about e-commerce initiative and retail apps, whatever. And so they understand tech. B2B process industry is about the furthest you can think from actual digitization, because they don't need to. They have no teams to be able to take care of that. They have no infrastructure. Most often, they don't have the drive to do anything about it.
I would say that there is a continuum between those very consumer-facing businesses that have very high competition, high turnover. They had to do e-commerce so they know digital and more traditional businesses, which is interesting. Because, for example, what Tesla did is bring a tech consumer-centric approach to building products. They hired a lot of engineers from Apple. The engineers from Apple, they think of the product as a platform for software. They think that they can innovate a lot on the platform and have shorter development cycles, and create an ecosystem, and all those things. The automotive executive, they had no clue that this was even possible because they never worked in that type of environment.
And so the actual disruption brought, yes. But the real disruption is how they consider the product. That is coming to all consumer-facing products. One example that I love is, to me, the difference between digital manufacturing and operations and not having that is the difference between Thermomix, where you can upload the recipe and have your dish automatically made in the pan. The difference between the pan and the Thermomix is the actual difference. I've been deep into the architecture of cars. The difference between the Tesla and this one best is about to say, in terms of software, like it's five years later.
Erik: Okay. So we've kind of defined the target manufacturer. Then you think, well, what about the vendors that are serving them? You defined the space that you're looking to — big opportunity, no competitive vendors. But I've got to imagine if there's a big opportunity, there's probably a lot of legacy factories, technology providers, whether it's an IBM or a Siemens or whoever else that probably has something in their product portfolio that's addressing that. There are probably some startups that might not be doing a great job but, at least, in their marketing materials say, "We are addressing problem X, Y, and Z." Then you have to ask the question of like, okay, how do you determine that the incumbents, whether it's an existing startup or a large legacy technology provider are doing a sufficiently poor job that you can actually build a venture and beat them to the market?
How do you kind of break that down and say, "You know what? Even though there's five companies, large and small, that say that they have products addressing this, I've done some analysis. And I don't believe that their products are properly addressing the need," especially if it's an incumbent corporate that has 1,000 times as many resources as you, and maybe has some kind of product there. How do you, as an investor, make the logic work? That even though this company has all the sales channels and the customer base embedded on, we think we can get the right product to market and beat them here.
Renan: You're touching my favorite subject. There are two parts of them. To what you were saying just before, big companies are usually doing their best and their good job. From a strategy point of view, we address half of existing pain points where there is a new shift, a new technology, a new way of operating that makes it so that something 10 times better can be built. Not 20%. We don't do 20%. Because plenty percent, it will be stuck in product hell. So 10 times better than the alternative, because there is a tech shift because there is something. That's the first part of the answer.
The second part of the answer is new need. Let me take an example. We are currently launching something about the resiliency of supply chains and the visibility of supplier but also the supplier of your supplier, supplier of this supplier and this supplier, and say, okay, if there is Y in Taiwan, do I still have a business? That's a new need. Five years ago, nobody was willing to pay for that. But now everybody wants to pay for that. First is there is tech that makes it so that it's 10 times better than the alternative on unit. Then when you say it's how you do it with computers that are 10 times larger, there is one secret thing in terms of go-to-market for those — the deal. You want the business that is launched to be doing something that structurally your company staff cannot because it destroys a part of their business.
Let me take an example. We recently co-created a no-code ERP for small businesses, 50 to 200 people. The wall model is that the implementation costs 10k compared to the implementation costs being 120k to 150k for comparable-sized businesses. We say to them, keep your accounting software. Don't change your accounting software. Just take the operations module as is.
And so if you look at competition, they are not 10 times or 100 times. They are 1 million times bigger than the 10 people startup that we are investing in. But one of their main assets is that they have a lot of consultants while doing the sales for them. They don't have the direct relationship to client. They are going through consultants and people who implement the software for them. Those consultants live because they charge high fees to implement the software. So if you get rid of the fees, there's no consultants anymore. But the competitor, they need the consultants to be able to do their sales. And so the competitor is stuck into a strategical headache, which is, if I want to compete with that offer, I have to get rid of what is today fueling my business.
And so those are the best companies that we are trying to position in the market — those that either address an existing need but 10 times better. That's the case for the ERP, for example — and/or address the new pain point. And then in the positioning of the offer, we make it so that it's very good for the end user and the client. It destroys the part of the strategic positioning of the existing actors. When you have that, it's kind of magic.
Erik: You mentioned this kind of 10x better. That's a great example, where you have a legacy product where there's actually a lot of dissatisfaction in the market. What technology shift was it that allowed you to build a solution that is 10x lower cost to deploy?
Renan: Essentially, it's really interesting. Because we have four or five of those at OSS. We are team of technologists. We have 5 to 10 coders at any given time in the office. For example, for this ERP, it was graph database. So graph database has been invented less than 10 years ago. Graph database makes it so that it's very easy to add objects and link them to existing data structure, which is the exact opposite of a traditional database. We've all been there with an Excel file. You wanted to have a new Excel file to talk with the first Excel file. You had to do manually the kind of this goes with this. It was hell. So this is traditional. That fundamental tech shift makes it, so that anybody can add data. The hell in implementing ERP was actually mainly that structure, and then the leader of processes. And so by leveraging technology to kill those kind of fundamental blocking things was what's enabled us to create the business.
Finally, the consultants are a human proxy to solve the data fundamental issue to put in place the ERP. But issue just killed the fundamental data issue, you don't need consultants. And so the guy at the end gets a strategy headache because they are leveraging consultants. And so that's one example, the graph database technology.
Another is obviously AI. AI is just redefining what can be done. For example, the supply chain visibility solution that we are doing is relying on GPT-4. We are using GPT-4 to find and browse the web to find your suppliers or suppliers of these players and blah, blah, blah. So AI is an obvious go. The third one, finally, is the mobile revolution. Because mobile use in factories is to nothings that you can unlock new use cases. One example is that there are some companies that are charging 100k to do some Gemini cognition cameras. Costly. The camera in an iPhone is actually better. Those kinds of fundamental shifts, the low technologies take us to find some cracks in the market.
Erik: Yeah, that last one is a great example. Consumer technology that is better, cheaper and also has the embedded software included than the legacy or the incumbent technologies. Let's see. Another challenge that you're going to face — you've already touched on this a bit — is the challenge of putting together a founding team. You mentioned your logic around putting together technology providers or founders. Nonetheless, I think that's very challenging, right? Finding the right people, finding people that have an appreciation of also the complexity of manufacturing, how to sell a solution to manufacturing, and then actually getting those people to join an industrial company as opposed to an e-commerce company or whatever, other options that they might have had. It sounds like maybe their background might be coming from those areas. You have to convince them to jump into a new market. How do you source your talent? How do you convince them to actually join you on this journey? Because I think this is a very, very common challenge for anybody who's trying to put together a team.
Renan: It is. So 30% of my time is just recruiting. We recruit. We launch four to five companies a year. And so we have to source 30 to 40 founders per year. We get 4,000 applications per year. So it's a lot of my time and the time of my team. We leverage one thing that is very important, which is our thesis and what we stand for. Our vision is very simple. Our vision is that if we want to solve the crisis, we'd have to totally change the way we produce and consume things. Everything around you has been done in factory. Everything. Everything on you, everything that you're wearing has been done in the factory. And so what is your highest change of changing the world and solving the crisis? Is it by doing an app, or is it by changing fundamentally the way we produce and consume things? I think the latter. This type of thesis in vision and values brings incredible quality and caliber founders because they get it.
The second thing is a stat that we are not that proud of. That is the stat. It is what we call the 12-week process. For 12 weeks, we work together. At the end of the 12th week, the founder can say, "I'm out. I don't want to work with that. I'll withdraw" OSS can say sorry. This is not going to work. We don't see ourselves building an incredible company with you. 40% of all the founders that we start with, we don't end lose. But a statistic that I'm very proud of is that after three years and a half, we never had one germ of hunger. Not one from the start. Because when you've been in the trenches together, trying to solve very complex thing for 12 weeks, during certainty over about the character of someone is close to zero or as close to zero as you can get. We haven't solved the thing. It's an uphill battle always, every day. But this is how we do it.
Erik: Okay. Yeah, I know. That sounds like you have a good process. I like this due diligence approach as well. Let's see. Then also, attendant on the talent topic. You're based in Paris. You mentioned the kind of companies that you're working with. So a lot of family-owned, medium-sized businesses. Just mentally, I'm thinking kind of mid-sized European company. But then, of course, Asia is kind of the factory of the world. So I'd say there's very different cost structures, different scales, different supply chains. Also, different maybe talent profiles and even different motives for founders. Some of the motives that you were saying sound to me like European motives. If I'm thinking about a Chinese founder, it might be more directive. Like, "Here's the money. Go make yourself a fortune." That might be a bit more of the proposition. But where geographically do you focus when it comes to both manufacturers that you're evaluating to identify needs and opportunities, and then also the talent for the teams that you're building?
Renan: We're 60% Europe, 30% U.S. and 10% Asia. When I say Europe, it's all over Europe. Asia is very different as a market. Asia's software market is actually very small. Asian factories don't pay for software. They pay for hardware. Usually, the software is free. So the things that are working a lot in Asia are marketplaces and all software in that enabled hardware. Let's put it that way. You sell the hardware and you get software package with the hardware. That's basically how the market is.
A very interesting trend is that, in the U.S. and Europe, reshoring is happening full blast. An interesting stat. There are more factories opened in 2023 than in 2019 to 2022 in the U.S. It's happening full blast with the geopolitical tensions, with the shortage that we live through during COVID, with also the political pressure that is Putin, Joe Biden or everything. It's happening, and it's the macro trend for the next 10 years. And as exemplified by Tesla and whatnot, now it is possible to be highly competitive with a high cost of labor because of automation, because of software in factories. And so this is the new model. That is enabling reshoring. And so yeah, the macro trend is clear and is here to stay.
Erik: Okay. Absolutely. I can see that logic. Then, of course, there's the intense challenge of finding talent in the U.S., in Europe. I don't know as much in Europe. But certainly, in the US, there actually wants to work in a factory. That creates a lot of demand for software. Maybe the last question here and then there might be one or two other things that you want to touch on. There's a lot of companies that build corporate venture entities in order to try to do what you're doing. You could say, on paper, those companies have a lot of advantages versus LSSs in terms of scale, in terms of access to customers, et cetera. But I think it's probably fair to say, and I think a lot of them would agree, that their success rate is quite low.
So if you were to give advice to a corporate that is trying to build their own ventures in areas outside of their domain expertise, what advice would you give them? What do you think are the challenges or the reasons that their success rate is low? Would it just be, "Hey, get out of this space and invest in our companies instead?"
Renan: First, hopefully, in five years, when all my bad stationery is liquid and my paper multiple is realized, I'll be in a position to give advice. Those are not advice. Those are just my thoughts. I would say the main thing that makes corporate venture success rates so low is incentives. Venture is a hit-driven business. The difference between a world-class founder and a not world-class founder is not 30%. It is the difference between 100 exits and noise.
So the golden question is, let's say you have in your face, someone will create two companies, sold them for 100 million and wants to start another company. Why should he or she want to work with you? If the answer is, I have 10 clients and the consultant in innovation who gives advice and a former regional sales director who likes startups that heads different, then you're in for a bad time. I've actually seen some corporate venture being successful — the Microsoft one, the Coinbase One, the Michelin one. They always are extremely careful to craft the right incentives. And so to attract world-class founder, you have to have the best deal. For example, to assess, my deal is the money that you'll get from borrowing is any other firm. So it's not more or less. The access to markets, the caliber of talents you'll be working with, and the track record that we have in creating startups makes it sure that you're 5x to 10x more likely to reach 5 million sales than if you were on your own. That's the value. That's the product.
Most corporate firms, their product is their logo. And so they get either stuck with non-promising founders and companies, or they invest when it's too late and very expensive to invest in future successes. And so the return is not that great. So I would say that. It's a brutal business to be in. It's really hard to be good at corporate venture. What I would say also is invest. But also, in some other firms, get used to that ecosystem. Get a lot of information about what's going on. Before creating a product and a product that you can say in the eyes of world-class founder, you should take that deal. Because even if Sequoia or other tier-one firms are working, I wanted to presume mine is better. It's not about money. It's not about your logo. It's about what is the deal for founders.
Erik: One more question on this topic. Have you had corporates that come to you and say, "I want you to build this company, and then I want to have the opportunity to buy it back at X multiple within three years if I like it?" Because I've had some corporates ask me about that. I was like, okay. How do you think about that?
Renan: Yeah, if I had $1 each time this deal was proposed, I would have at least $20. But in all seriousness, if you want to have success in venture, knowing that it's a hit-driven business, why would people able to create hit businesses work with capped opportunities? This makes no sense. This meant absolutely zero sense. What this will do is attract people who think that cannot create hit but who think they can get paid by fees to create a thing, but not a hit. And so it's a fundamental business difference. That is actually started as economists, and it is really the preferences. If someone thinks they can create a billion-dollar company, they will never accept the deal. If someone thinks they cannot create a billion-dollar company and they think the work profile of the deed is good, then they will build that company. There's an issue because you want to actively select against the people who think they are not going to create a deal under our company. And so yeah, preference.
Erik: Yeah, it's a very clear way to look at it. It makes sense. Cool. Renan, anything that we haven't touched on that's important for folks to understand?
Renan: Well, if you're the founder and you're thinking that what we just talked about is interesting, and you're interested beyond that opportunities, just give us a call. OSS.ventures is our website. Please go and apply. Also, for corporate, there is hope. You can invest. There are a lot of companies able to crack the code. And so wishing you the best. Also, if you want to have a chat on this, you're more than welcome.
Erik: Awesome. Renan, really thanks for your time today. Thank you so much, Erik.
Renan: Thanks for tuning in to another edition of the Industrial IoT Spotlight. Don't forget to follow us on Twitter @IoToneHQ, and to check out our database of case studies on IoTone.com. If you have a unique insight or a project deployment story to share, we'd love to feature you on a future edition. Write us at firstname.lastname@example.org.