Effectively securing its generation and transmission operations required the company to confront and overcome the following challenges:Inherently insecure OT networks: Complex and widely distributed architecture, limited OT visibility, and inadequate security controls gave attackers hundreds of possible entry points into the company’s OT networks.OT redundancy: The redundancy of the company’s OT environment meant that attacks were typically only detected if they caused immediate, easily noticeable damage. Heavy reliance on OT remote access: The company’s power plants utilize a large number of unmanned power generation units and also rely on multiple vendors to maintain and service their heat recovery generation systems (HRGS). 

Existing data validity did not meet the requirements of CE and IS teams. Existing workflows were unable to support leadership’s strategic vision. Unable to dynamically update their computerized maintenance management system (CMMS). Significant change-management hurdles existed between isolated teams. Parkland allocated an insufficient budget to maintain project momentum and meet all expected outcomes.

This consumer goods company faced challenges in securing its global operational technology (OT) environment, including incompatible security tools, unmonitored remote access, misconfigurations, and a patchwork of systems due to acquisitions. Additionally, the company lacked OT anomaly detection capabilities.

With more than 20 lines that span nearly 1,500 kilometers, this mass rapid transit system faces challenges in connectivity and digitization, visibility into industrial networks, maintaining SIL standards, and dealing with legacy OT assets.